Q1. 2In the Transcendental Deduction, how does Kant argue that we can know objects of experience only by applying the categories to what is given in sensation? What arguments might be raised against his position, and how might he reply?

Within the Transcendental Deduction Immanuel Kant claims that we can know objects of experience only be applying the categories to what is given in sensation. There are twelve categories according to Kant and the categories are apriori concepts which are universal and necessary. He states that, 1"Categories are concepts of an object in general, through which an intuition of an object is considered as determined in respect of one of the logical functions for judging."[1] Kant thinks that these categories are required as are our sensory faculties in knowing objects of experience. He claims that 1"...all experience contains both a sensory intuition through which something is given, and a concept of an object which is given in intuition, or appears."[2] For objects of experience to be possible then it is thought that apriori concepts are necessary conditions. Kant takes it for granted that people reading his Critique will have the opinion that we live in a world of experience and not in world that contains only, 3"...fleeting impressions and ideas - no self, no objects, no causal connections,"[3] which was the opinion of Hume who was much criticised by Kant. The connectedness of intuition (which depends on sensory experiences) and thought is what creates the world of experience and objects of experience. This belief is crucial for reading of the whole of the Transcendental Deduction.
Various parts are required to create 3the concept of an object for Kant. We need an intuition but it is not just this alone because an intuition does not have within it 5the concept of an object. Experience is also required and is different from an intuition as it contains the manifestation 5of the concept of an object to us. Experience is therefore considered as empirical knowledge 5and it is this knowledge that contains the concepts of an object as apriori. As MacDonald Ross summarises it, 3"The objective validity (i.e. necessary applicability to objects) of the categories depends on the fact that experience would be impossible without their adding the form of thought to sensibility."[4] In other words the categories need to be applied to objects of experience and that sensations are also required to fully know the objects of experience. As Kant states, 1"...since no object of experience at all can be thought except by the means of the categories."[5] The categories require there to be apriori conditions of experience and experience requires intuitions and thought.
For me, Kant seems to be saying that an object of experience can be known to us through the categories which are apriori concepts and from our sensations. It is a mixture of both of these things that is required. This, to me, makes sense because I think that this is a good balance of what is presented to us in reality and also what we have in our minds as apriori concepts. It is as if the apriori concepts that we believe to be true can be supported by that which is given to us through sensation.
A criticism that could possibly be levelled at this is at the categories which are apriori concepts. Apriori concepts are concepts not gained through experience. Therefore how can we rely on these concepts? Also what we are given through sensation could possibly be in doubt. How can we know what we are truly experiencing through sensations? Someone could be hallucinating thinking they were experiencing sensations that they actually were not. This coupled with apriori concepts could lead us to interpret objects of experience in the wrong way. Kant may reply to this by saying, 1"...apriori concepts must be known as apriori preconditions of the possibility of experience - whether of the foundation which it contains, or of the thought. Concepts which provide the necessary foundation for the possibility of experience are necessary by virtue of that very fact."[6] I think Kant means that the objects of experience evenly depend on intuition and thought and the apriori concepts of the categories so it is a mixture of these things that means we can know objects of experience. This theory appeals to the fact that we already have concepts in our brain apriori that we have not gained through experience. For example, I may never have seen a pin popping a balloon but I would think it would be fairly probable that if I put a pin into a balloon then the likelihood is that the balloon would pop. It is these apriori concepts that mean we can know about things without having to have totally experienced them. The theory also appeals to sensory evidence for objects of experience which an individual could be also fairly certain about. This sensory evidence can support the apriori concepts and make objects of experience known to us.
In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant gives an explanation as to how objects of experience can be known to us. He claims it is 4only by applying the categories to what is given in sensation. This meaning that we have to apply our apriori concepts to sensation in reality so 4that we can know objects of experience. Without the various parts to this we could not know objects of experience for example Kant says, 3"...experience would be impossible without their adding the form of thought to sensibility. Without thought, there would be no experience."[7] I think Kant's claim is a valid one and one that makes sense because one part seems to support the other.


. Kant, I. trans. MacDonald Ross, G. "The Critique of Pure Reason." Unpublished . MacDonald, G. Running Commentary, 2"Notes on the Transcendental Logic and the Transcendental Deduction." Unpublished.
----------------------- [1] Quote from Kant, I. found in MacDonald Ross, G. trans. "The Critique of Pure Reason" [B128] Unpublished. [2] Ibid [B126] [3] Quote from MacDonald Ross, G. Running Commentary, 2"Notes on the Transcendental Logic and the Transcendental Deduction." Unpublished. [4] Ibid [5] Quote from Kant, I. found in MacDonald Ross, G. trans. "The Critique of Pure Reason" [B126] [6] Ibid [7] MacDonald, G. Running Commentary, 2"Notes on the Transcendental Logic and the Transcendental Deduction." Unpublished.