<l1> [B74] The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

Our knowledge arises from two fundamental sources in the mind. The first of these is the faculty of receiving representations (the receptivity of impressions); the second is the faculty of knowing an object through these representations (the spontaneity of concepts). Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to the representation of it (which is a mere determination of the mind). Thus intuition and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge. Neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them in some way or other, nor intuition without concepts, can result in any knowledge.

<l2> Both intuitions and concepts are either pure or empirical. They are empirical if they contain sensation — which presupposes the actual presence of the object. They are pure when no sensation is mixed in with the representation. Sensation can be called the matter of sensory knowledge. So pure [B75] intuition contains only the form under which something is intuited, and a pure concept contains only the form of the thought of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or concepts are possible apriori; empirical intuitions or concepts are possible only aposteriori.

<l3> In my terminology, sensibility is the receptivity of our mind to receiving representations, in so far as it is affected in some way or other. By contrast, understanding is the faculty of producing representations by ourselves, or the spontaneity of knowledge. Our nature is such that our intuition can never be other than sensory, that is, it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. By contrast, our understanding is the faculty for thinking the object of sensory intuition.

<l4> Neither of these faculties is to be preferred over the other. Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind. Therefore it is just as necessary for us to make our concepts sensory (that is, to add to them their object in intuition), as it is for us to make our intuitions intellectual (that is, to bring them under concepts). Neither faculty (or power of the mind) can take over the function of the other. The understanding cannot intuit anything, and the senses cannot think anything. They cannot give rise to knowledge unless they are united. [B76] But this should not lead us to blend their roles together — rather, we have every reason to keep them carefully separate and distinct from each other. This is why I distinguish between the science of the rules of sensibility in general (i.e. Aesthetic), from the science of the rules of the understanding in general (i.e. Logic).

<l5> Logic in turn can be undertaken with two different aims: either as the logic of the general use of the understanding, or as the logic of its special use. General logic contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought, without which no use at all can be made of the understanding. It therefore deals with these laws without reference to differences between the objects which the understanding is directed towards. The logic of the special use of the understanding contains the rules for thinking correctly about a particular class of objects. General logic can be called the logic of elements, and special logic can be called the instrument of this or that science. Special logic will usually be taught in universities as an introductory training for the sciences. This is despite the fact that it comes last in the order in which human reason proceeds, and is arrived at only after the science has long been ready, and needs nothing but the final touch for it to become perfectly adjusted and complete. For we already have to know the objects of a science pretty well, before [B77] we can specify the rules for establishing the science of these objects.

<l6> General logic is either pure or applied. In pure logic, we leave out of account any empirical circumstances surrounding the exercise of our understanding — for example, the influences of the senses, the play of the imagination, the laws of memory, the force of habit, our inclinations, etc. Thus we leave out of account the sources of prejudice, and indeed all the causes which might, rightly or wrongly, be supposed to give rise to particular items of knowledge. These are relevant merely to the particular circumstances in which the understanding is exercised, and experience is required for us to know them. So a pure general logic deals with absolutely apriori principles. It is a rule-book of the understanding and of reason, but only in respect of what is formal in their use, whatever the content — i.e. whether it is empirical or transcendental.

<l7> A general logic is called applied when it is directed towards the rules for the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical circumstances which are the province of psychology. So applied logic includes empirical principles, even though they are still universal in so far as it is concerned with the use of the understanding without regard to differences between objects. Therefore it is neither a rule-book for the understanding in general, nor an instrument of particular sciences, [B78] but only a means for eliminating fallacies from the understanding of ordinary people.

<l8> In general logic, the part which is to constitute the pure doctrine of reason must be kept entirely separate from the part which constitutes applied logic (even though this is still general). Only the first part is essentially a science, even though it is a brief and boring one, as is required for the academically appropriate exposition of a doctrine of the elements of the understanding.

<l9> In expounding pure general logic, the logician must always bear in mind two rules:

1. As a general logic, it leaves out of account any content of the knowledge had by the understanding, or any differences among its objects. It deals with nothing other than the pure form of thought.
2. As a pure logic, it has no empirical principles. So it does not (as some people have persuaded themselves) derive anything from psychology, which is therefore entirely irrelevant to the rule-book of the understanding. Pure logic is a discipline in which everything is demonstrated, and everything in it must be certain completely apriori.

<l10> The expression ‘applied logic’ usually means a discipline which contains particular exercises in applying rules supplied by pure logic. But what I mean by it is a representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary use in practice — in other words, its use under the contingent circumstances of the subject [B79] which can hinder or help this use, and which are all given only empirically. It deals with attentiveness (and its hindrances and consequences), the causes of error, the state of doubt, scruples, conviction, etc.

<l11> The relation between pure general logic and applied logic is the same as the relation between pure and applied ethics. Pure ethics contains only the necessary moral laws of a free will in general. By contrast, moral instruction as such considers these laws in the context of obstacles such as feelings, inclinations, and passions, which human beings are subject to in varying degrees. Moral instruction can never yield a true and demonstrative science of ethics, because it depends on empirical and psychological principles, just like applied logic.

<l12> II

As I have shown, general logic leaves out of account any content of knowledge — that is, any relation between knowledge and its object. It considers only the logical form of the relations between one item of knowledge and another — that is, the form of thought in general. But, given that there are pure as well as empirical intuitions (as I have proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic), there may well be a similar distinction between pure and empirical [B80] thoughts of objects. Including pure thoughts would generate a logic in which not all the content of knowledge was left out of account. Such a logic, which contained merely the rules for the pure thought of an object, would still exclude knowledge which had any empirical content. However, it would extend to the source of our knowledge of objects, in so far as that source cannot be ascribed to objects themselves.

<l13> By contrast, general logic has nothing to do with this source of knowledge. General logic deals with all representations, whether they are originally given apriori in ourselves or are given only empirically. It considers representations merely with reference to the laws which govern how the understanding relates them to one another when it thinks. So it deals only with the form of understanding which can be imposed on representations whatever their source.

<l14> Here I make an observation which covers everything that follows, and which must be carefully borne in mind. The term ‘transcendental’ refers to the possibility of apriori knowledge or of its apriori use. So it must not be applied to just any apriori knowledge, but only to knowledge through which we know that and how certain representations (whether intuitions or concepts) are used or are possible entirely apriori. Hence neither space, [B81] nor any apriori geometrical determination of it, can be called a transcendental representation. The term ‘transcendental’ applies only to the knowledge that geometrical representations are not of empirical origin at all, and to the possibility that they can nevertheless relate apriori to objects of experience. Similarly, the application of space to objects in general would also be transcendental; but if it is restricted solely to objects of the senses, then it is called empirical. So the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs only to the critique of knowledge, and it is irrelevant to the relation between knowledge and its object.

<l15> It is reasonable to expect that perhaps there could be concepts which relate to objects apriori, not as pure or sensory intuitions, but simply as actions of pure thought — and hence as concepts which are of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin. So in anticipation of this possibility, I form for myself the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational knowledge, by means of which we think objects completely apriori. Such a science determines the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge. It must therefore be called Transcendental Logic, since it deals only with the laws of the understanding and of reason. However, it is concerned with reason only in so far as it relates to objects apriori, [B82] unlike general logic, which ignores any distinction between empirical and pure rational knowledge.

<l16> III

There is an old and famous question, which was asked of logicians in order to drive them into a corner, and put them into a position where they must either fall into a wretched circular argument, or admit their ignorance, and hence the futility of their whole discipline. The question was: ‘What is truth?’ Here the definition of the word ‘truth’ is taken for granted — namely that it is the correspondence of knowledge with its object. The question at issue is that of the universal and reliable criterion for the truth of any item of knowledge.

<l17> It is already a major and necessary indication of intelligence and insight, if someone knows what questions can rationally be asked. Some questions are intrinsically absurd, and do not need to be answered. If such questions are asked, they bring shame on the person who asks them, and sometimes also have the damaging effect of misleading the unwary listener into giving absurd answers. We then have the laughable picture [B83] (as the ancients used to say) of one person milking a he-goat, and the other holding a sieve underneath.

<l18> If truth consists in the correspondence of knowledge with its object, then this object must thereby be distinguished from other objects. For knowledge is false if it does not correspond to the objects it relates to, even if it contains something which could well be true of other objects. Now a universal criterion of truth would be one which was valid of all knowledge without distinction of object. But such a criterion leaves out of account all content of knowledge (which is its relation to its object). So, since truth involves precisely this content, it is clearly quite impossible and absurd to ask for a criterion for the truth of this content of knowledge. Therefore a sufficient and at the same time universal criterion of truth cannot possibly be produced. Since above I have already called the content of knowledge its matter, this must be rephrased as: There can be no requirement for a universal criterion of the truth of the matter of knowledge, since it is self-contradictory.

<l19> It is quite different if we consider knowledge merely in respect of its form — that is to say, setting aside anything to do with its content. In this case, it is just as clear that a logic must specify a criterion of truth through the universal and [B84] necessary rules of the understanding which it provides. For anything that contradicts these rules is false, since in such a case the understanding contradicts its own general rules of thought, and hence contradicts itself. But these criteria apply only to the form of truth (that is, of thought in general), and to this extent they are perfectly correct, but not sufficient. Knowledge might be completely consistent with the requirements of logical form (i.e. that it must not contradict itself), yet still fail to correspond to its object. The purely logical criterion of truth is the correspondence of knowledge with the universal and formal laws of the understanding and of reason. This is certainly the necessary condition for all truth; but it is a negative one, and logic can take us no further. Logic can provide no touchstone for revealing any error which concerns content rather than form.

<l20> General logic analyses the whole formal business of the understanding and of reason into its elements, and presents them as the principles of any logical critique of our knowledge. So this part of logic can be called the analytic part. It is at least the negative touchstone of truth, in that all knowledge must first be tried and tested against these rules with respect to its form, before the knowledge itself can be investigated with respect to its content, in order to find out [B85] whether it contains any positive truth in relation to its object.

<l21> But however consistent the mere form of knowledge may be with the laws of logic, it falls far short of settling the truth of knowledge as far as its matter is concerned — that is, its objective truth. So no-one can be so rash as to make judgements or assertions about objects on the basis of logic alone. It is first necessary to draw on information about the objects which has been established from outside logic. Only then can we use the laws of logic to investigate the use of this information, and its interconnection within a coherent whole — or to put it a better way, only then can we use these laws to test it.

<l22> We seem to possess an art, by which we can provide all our knowledge with the form of the understanding, however empty and impoverished that knowledge may be with regard to its content. But this deceptive art has misled people into using general logic, which is merely a rule-book for judging, as if it were an instrument for actually producing at least the illusion of objective assertions. Consequently, it has in fact been misused. When general logic is treated as if it were an instrument, it is called dialectic.

<l23> The ancients employed the term ‘dialectic’ for a science or art in many different senses. Yet we can infer from their actual use of the term that for them [B86] it was never anything other than the logic of illusion. It was the sophistical art of giving the appearance of truth to ignorance, or even to deliberate deception. It did this by imitating the method of thoroughness which logic prescribes universally, and by using its classification system to adorn every empty pretension. So it can be taken as a reliable and useful warning that, whenever general logic is considered to be an instrument of the understanding, it is always a logic of illusion — in other words, it is dialectical. For logic tells us nothing about the content of knowledge, but only about the merely formal preconditions for its correspondence with the understanding; and these preconditions are in any case completely indifferent as to the objects of knowledge. It is unreasonable to expect, or even to pretend that logic can serve as an instrument for broadening and extending knowledge. Any such pretension will end up in mere verbal disputes, in which anyone asserts or denies what they like with equal plausibility.

<l24> If philosophy is taught in this way, it is quite unworthy of the dignity of the discipline. This is why I have preferred to include dialectic within logic, as the critique of the dialectical illusion; and it is how the term is to be understood in the present work.

<l25> [B87] IV

Just as I isolated sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic, so in the Transcendental Logic I isolate the understanding. From our knowledge, I abstract just that component of our thinking which has its origin solely in the understanding. However, the use of this pure knowledge depends on the precondition that objects must be given to us in intuition for this knowledge to apply to. Without intuition, all our knowledge lacks objects, and remains completely empty. So the Transcendental Analytic is the part of the Transcendental Logic which deals with the elements of the pure knowledge of understanding, and the principles without which no object can be thought at all. It is at the same time a logic of truth, since no knowledge can contradict it without at once losing all its content — that is, all relation to some object or other, and hence all truth.

<l26> However, there is a great temptation to use this pure knowledge of understanding and its axioms independently of experience, and even beyond its limits. This is despite the fact that only experience can provide us with the material (objects) [B88] for these pure concepts of the understanding to apply to. Therefore the understanding is in danger of making a material use of the merely formal principles of pure understanding, through empty sophistries. It is also in danger of making indiscriminate judgments about objects which are not given to us, and perhaps which could in no way ever be given to us.

<l27> Essentially, transcendental logic can only be a rule-book for judging the empirical use of the understanding. So it is misused if we take it as the instrument for a universal and unlimited use of the understanding, and if we are so bold as to use the pure understanding by itself to judge, assert, and decide synthetically about objects in general. As soon as we do this, the use of the pure understanding becomes dialectical.

<l28> So the second part of the Transcendental Logic must be a critique of this dialectical illusion, and it is called the Transcendental Dialectic. It is not the art of producing such illusions dogmatically — an art which is unfortunately all too prevalent among the many and varied forms of metaphysical conjuring. Rather, it is a critique of the understanding and of reason in so far as they are applied beyond the natural world. Its purpose is to expose the false illusion of groundless pretensions, and unfounded claims to have made new discoveries, and to have extended our knowledge through transcendental axioms alone. Instead, the Transcendental Dialectic will be confined to judging the pure understanding, and protecting it against sophistical illusion.

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