© George MacDonald Ross, 1975–1999

Chapter 8

The word ‘substance’ [n.7] applies both to simple bodies, such as earth, fire, water, and the rest, [n.8] and generally to bodies which consist of these, such as animals, spirits, and their parts. All of these are called ‘substance’ because they are not predicated of a subject, but other things are predicated of them. But in another sense, a substance is anything which exists in such things and is the cause of their existence, and is not predicated of a subject — for example, the soul in an animal. In addition, the word ‘substance’ applies to parts which exist in such things, and define and indicate their ‘thisness’, [n.9] and are such that if they are removed, the whole is removed. An example (according to some) would be a solid body in relation to a plane surface; or a plane surface in relation to a line; [n.10] and generally, some think that number is an instance of this, because if it is removed, everything ceases to exist, and it defines everything. [n.11] Again, the ‘what it was to be’ [n.12] of everything (which is its definition when put into words) is said to be its substance. So the outcome is that the word ‘substance’ is used in two senses: in one sense, it is the ultimate subject, which is not predicated of anything else; and in the other sense, it is whatever has its own ‘thisness’ and exists independently, such as the shape or form of each individual thing.

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