LEIBNIZ AND RENAISSANCE NEOPLATONISM
FOOTNOTES
1. The second half of the present paper is adapted from a paper of the same title delivered at the symposium ‘Leibniz et la Renaissance’, which took place in June 1981 at the Domaine de Seillac, Loire-et-Cher, France. It is due to be published in the acta of the symposium, which will constitute a Sonderheft of Studia Leibnitiana. I am grateful to Dr. I.N. Robins of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of the first half of the paper. In the notes, I use the following abbreviations: A = Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Akademie-Ausgabe. C = Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, ed. L. Couturat (Paris, 1903). D = G. G. Leibnitii Opera Omnia, ed. L. Dutens, 6 vols (Geneva, 1768). E = G. G. Leibnitii Opera Philosophica, ed. J.E. Erdmann (Berlin, 1840). FC = Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz, ed. Foucher de Careil (Paris, 1857). G = Die philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7. vols (Berlin, 1875–90). GM = Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin & Halle, 1849–63). GDS = Leibniz, Deutsche Schriften, ed. G.E. Guhrauer, 2 vols (Berlin, 1838–40).
2. e.g. ‘Neoplatonist’ 1837 (Oxford English Dictionary); ‘Néoplatonisme’: 1836 (Grand Larousse).
3. (London, 1905), 57–8. cf. B. Bosanquet, Essays and Addresses (London, 1889), 92–107.
5. ‘Plato’s enigmatic lecture "On the Good"’, Phronesis 25 (1980) 5–37.
6. e.g. F.A. Yates, The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age (London, 1975); D.P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (London, 1958).
7. David Brewster, Memoirs of the Life, Writings and Discourses of Sir Isaac Newton, vol. II (Edinburgh, 1855) 374–6.
8. Richard S. Westfall, ‘The Changing world of the Newtonian Industry’, in Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976) 175–184.
9. e.g. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London, 1958); David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London, 1976).
10. A.M.J. Festugière, Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon (Paris, 1936), esp. pp. 202–9.
11. A.N.M. Rich, ‘The Platonic ideas as the thoughts of God’, in Mnemosyne IV, 7 (1954) 123–133; H.A. Wolfson, ‘Extradeical and intradeical interpretations of Platonic ideas’, in Journal of the History of Ideas 22 (1961) 3–32.
13. ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 47 (1973–4) 5–20.
14. Philosophical Investigations, Part I, paragraph 66.
15. e.g. Ilham Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life (London, 1979), esp. chapter 10, pp. 170–186.
16. Georges Rodier, ‘Sur une des origines de la philosophie de Leibniz’ [Plotinus], in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 10 (1902) 552–564; Walter Feilchenfeld, ‘Leibniz und Henry More’, in Kant-Studien 28 (1923) 323–334; Ernst Cassirer, Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge (Berlin, 1932) 108–9; Joseph Politella, Platonism, Aristotelianism and Cabalism in the Philosophy of Leibniz (University of Philadelphia Dissertation, 1938); Georges Friedmann, Leibniz et Spinoza (Paris, 1946) 232–240; Fernand Brunner, Études sur la signification historique de la philosophie de Leibniz (Paris, 1950) 36–45; Anne Becco, ‘Leibniz et François-Mercure van Helmont’, in Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 7 (1978) 119–142; Michalangelo Ghio, Il concetto di espressione in Leibniz e nella tradizione platonico-cristiana (Turin, 1979); Carolyn Merchant, ‘The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz’s Concept of the Monad’, in Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (l979) 255–269. Of these writers, only three seem at all interested in the problem to which this paper is addressed. Rodier (1902) suggests that Leibniz had forgotten how much he owed to Plotinus — but Leibniz’s prodigious memory makes this explanation completely implausible. Cassirer (1932) draws a spurious contrast between religious and scientific Platonism. Brunner (1950), p.39, refutes Cassirer, but offers no alternative.
18. G.VII.147–149: De Platone certiora dicere possumus, quia ejus scripta extant; ex quibus noscendus est, non ex Plotino aut Marsilio Ficino, qui mira semper et mystica affectantes dicere, tanti viri doctrinam corrupere, quod miror ab eruditis parum animadverti. Non sine admiratione vanitatis humanae notavi Platonicos posteriores, quae Magister egregia, docta et solida dixit . . . dissimulare, quae vero illi excidere ambigua aut hyperbolica cum forte genio indulsit et poëtam agere potuit . . . a praeclaris illis discipulis avide arripi, in pejus detorqueri et multis novis somniis onerari. Nimirum Plotinus, Jamblichus, Porphyrius, Philostratus, imo et Proclus allique Pythagorici et Platonici illorum temporum, plane superstitionibus dediti erant et miracula jactabant . . Franciscus Patritius . . . pseudo-Platonicorum lectione animum praecorruperat . . . Quae sane omnia verissima sunt, si recte interpreteris, et usus maximi, nec mihi notus est philosophus qui de Substantiis incorporalibus Platone rectius senserit, ut dolendum sit profecto tam excelsa, tam recta dogmata, tamdiu nugis quibusdam involuta et sepulta jacuisse.
19. A.II.i.467; IV.i.569; VI.ii.475; G.I.380–1.
20. Eclaircissement of 1698, G.IV.523–4. cf. also G.III.607.
21. Societas Theophilorum, 1671(?): C.7.
22. e.g. Leibniz presumably thought that ‘un et même un tout’ of Parmenides was also a Platonic concept, since he believed that Plato was in fundamental agreement with Parmenides. cf. FC.124.
23. Most of the texts referred to in this paper are evidence for this. Note also that Leibniz took the trouble to make his own abridged translations into Latin of the Phaedo and the Theaetetus (FC.44–144).
24. FC, Preface; Brunner, op. cit. (n.16, supra), pp. 17–35; Paul Schrecker, ‘Leibniz and the Timaeus’, in The Review of Metaphysics 4 (1951) 495–505; Benson Mates, ‘Leibniz and the Phaedo’, in Studia Leibnitiana, Suppl. 12 (1973) 135–148 [this does not complement Schrecker’s historical study, since Mates is concerned only with the distinction between reasons and causes]; Yvon Belaval, ‘Note sur Leibniz et Platon’, in Revue d’Histoire et Philosophie Religieuse 55 (1975) 49–54; Robert Bregman, The Classical Greek Influence on the Philosophy of Leibniz (University of Toronto Thesis, 1977).
26. G.III.605; VI.531, 544; VII.339–340; GM.VI.135.
27. G.VII.148: ‘Qui vero ad Platonem ipsum idoneus lector accedet . . .’
28. G.VII.148: ‘Quae sane omnia verissima sunt, si recte interpreteris . . .’
29. Note on the Theaetetus, FC.138: ‘haec . . . magni est momenti, si recte explicetur.’
30. Discours de Metaphysique 26, G.IV.451: ‘C’est ce que Platon a excellement bien considéré . . . pourvou qu’on la prenne bien.’
31. G.VII.496: ‘Dicimus, plus Platonem in recessu habere, quam vulgo apparet’. cf. letter to Ludwig von Seckendorf, 3rd January 1684, A.II.i.537 = A.I.iv.448–9: ‘Plus habere in recessu puto, quàm vulgò animadvertitur.’ The accentuation suggests that in both cases vulgo should be construed adverbially — but this does not affect the meaning.
32. André Robinet, Malebranche et Leibniz (Paris, 1955) 263 = GM.VI.134: ‘Quo quisque in philosophia interiore versatior est, eo facilius hoc agnoscit.’ For the context, see n.50, inf. The French version (G.III.45) has merely: ‘Les Philosophes les plus raisonnables en demeurent d’accord.’
33. E.446 = D.II.222–5: ‘Longe ergo preferendae sunt Platonis Notitiae innatae, quos reminiscentiae nomine velavit, tabulae rasae Aristotelis et Lockii aliorumque recentiorum, qui exotericos philosophantur.’
34. G.IV.452: ‘Cela s’accorde d’avantage avec les notions populaires, comme c’est la maniere d’Aristote, au lieu que Platon va plus au fond.’ cf. also A.II.i.537; VI.vi.48; G.III.204.
35. Letter to Ludwig von Seckendorf (cf. n.31, supra): ‘Agnoscam Platonem . . . passim fabulas illorum temporum captui accommodatas admiscere.’
36. G.VII.148: ‘Quae vero illi excidere ambigua aut hyperbolica cum forte genio indulsit et poëtam agere potuit . . .’
37. G.III.611: [Les sentimens] ‘de Platon sont plus sublimes, et ne laissent point d’avoir du solide; de sorte que de la maniere que je prends les choses, encor ces hyperboles se verifient bien souvent.’
38. G.VII.148: ‘De anima Mundi, de ideis subsistentibus extra res, de purgationibus animorum et Pyriphlegethonte, de Antro illo umbroso imaginum, aliaque similia.’ cf. letter to Foucher of 1686, G.I.380: ‘Ficino et Patritius ont ensuivi Platon, mais mal à mon avis, parce qu’ils se sont jettés sur les pensées hyperboliques, et ont abandonés ce qui estoit plus simple et en même temps plus solide. Ficinus ne parle partout que d’idées, d’Ames de monde, de Nombres Mystiques et choses semblables, au lieu de poursuivre les exactes definitions, que Platon tache de donner des notions.’ (‘Ficino and Patrizzi followed Plato, but badly in my opinion, since they rushed into exaggerated thoughts, and abandoned what was simplest and at the same time the most substantial. Ficino talks everywhere only of ideas, world-souls, mystical numbers and such-like things, instead of following up the precise definitions which Plato tried to give of notions.’)
39. e.g. A.I.vii.248; G.III.607; IV.446; GM.VI.134; C.7.
40. e.g. A.II.i.537; G.IV.451; VII.148; E.445.
41. e.g. A.II.i.537; E.445; G.III.605; VI.342; VII.148, 535–6.
42. e.g. A.II.i.537; E.445; G.VII.148. Other aspects are also mentioned in A.II.i.467; G.II.119; III.605; IV.299; C.7.
43. G.IV.299: ‘Je croy que Pythagore faisait la même chose et que sa metempsychose n’estoit que pour s’accommoder à la portée du vulgaire, mais parmy ses disciples il raisonnoit tout autrement.’ cf. G.VII.147, where he claims that the physics attributed to Pythagoras in the Timaeus was not genuinely his. cf. also Brunner, op. cit. (n.16, supra), pp. 41–42.
44. G.IV.523: ‘La reduction de tout aux harmonies ou nombres, idées et perceptions des Pythagoristes et Platoniciens.’
45. G.VII.497: ‘Philosophia etiam Mystica, ut Platonis et Pythagorae, habet usus suos, ut Theologia Mystica apud nos, inservitque animis fortius movendis. Maxima apud me Pythagorae existimatio est, et parum abest, quin ceteris veteribus Philosophis potiorem credam, cum et Mathesin et Scientiam incorporalium propemodum fundarit, invento hecatomba digno et praeclaro illo dogmate, quod omnes animae sint inextinctae.’ One wonders if the sacrifice of a hundred oxen is the most appropriate prize for discovering that animals have immortal souls.
47. My reason for giving it this date is that it was only as an afterthought that he added the analogy between creation and binary arithmetic, in which he had a renewed interest around this time. cf. H.J. Zacher, Die Hauptschriften zur Dyadik von G.W. Leibniz (Frankfurt am Main, 1973) 35. cf. also the letter to Rudolf August of 7/17 January 1697, in G.W. Leibniz, Zwei Briefe über das binäre Zahlensystem und die chinesische Philosophie, ed. Renate Loosen & Franz Vonessen (Stuttgart, 1968), and quoted in the Stadtsparkasse Hannover’s prospectus for its realisation of the Leibniz-Medaille (Hannover, 11110111101 [i.e. 1981]).
48. J.W. Shirley, ‘Binary Numeration before Leibniz’, in American Journal of Physics 19 (1951) 452–4.
49. ‘Imago Creationis’ and ‘Omnibus ex nihilo ducendis SUFFICIT UNUM’. cf. n.47, supra. Unfortunately the Stadtsparkasse’s medal misprints ex as fx.
50. G.III,607: ‘Je me flatte d’avoir penetré l’Harmonie des differens regnes, et d’avoir vû que les deux partis ont raison, pourveu qu’ils ne se choquent point; que tout se fait mechaniquement et metaphysiquement en même temps dans les phenomenes de la nature, mais que la source de la mecanique est dans la Metaphysique. Il n’étoit pas aisé de decouvrir ce Mystere, parce qu’il y a peu de gens qui se donnent la peine de joindre ces deux sortes d’etudes.’ cf. Robinet, op. cit. (n.32, supra) 263 = GM.VI.134: ‘Hinc jam apparet (paulo melius quam vulgo proponitur) quomodo vera Physica ex divinarum perfectionum fontibus sit haurienda. Deus enim est ultima ratio rerum, et Dei cognitio non minus est principium scientiarum quam essentia ejus et voluntas principia sunt rerum. Quo quisque in philosophia interiore versatior est, eo facilius hoc agnoscit.’ (‘From this it is now obvious (rather more so than in the normal run of explanations) how true Physics is to be derived from its source in the divine perfections. For God is the ultimate reason of things, and knowledge of God is no less the principle of the sciences than his essence and will are the principles of things. The more one is versed in esoteric philosophy, the more readily one will realise this.)
51. Perhaps this is why Leibniz seemed so pained that an excellent mathematician such as Proclus could at the same time have been one of the most superstitious of Neoplatonists. cf. Nouveaux Essais, IV.ii.9 (G.V.352), and G.VII.148: ‘imo et Proclus . . .’